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Special Article 
THE POLITICAL ECOHOMT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
by S J Bailey, Glasgow College of Technology* 
Introduction 
The field of local government finance has recently taken on increasing 
prominence in national affairs both in terms of its expenditure and the 
sources of income necessary for its financing. Central government through 
the Secretary of State for the Environment in England and the Secretaries of 
State for Scotland and for Wales, has taken on new powers to control local 
expenditures. However, it is not always clear what the consequences of 
such actions are for other agents in the economy. Hence this article 
attempts to trace such consequences, particular attention being paid to the 
Scottish experience. 
There are two avenues of approach in conducting such an investigation, 
derived from the dual nature of the British system of local government 
finance. First, local government finance has been used as a macro-economic 
instrument whereby income and expenditure have been manipulated to aid 
central government's control of the economy. How do the new powers 
recently given to the Secretary of State for Scotland further such control? 
Secondly, will the exercise of such powers necessarily be to the detriment 
of the equalising properties of the system of local government finance. 
This article attempts to provide an answer to both questions. 
(A) Local Government Finance as an Instrument of Macro-economic Control 
Whilst local authorities have a considerable degree of autonomy "the 
Government, however, has overall responsibility for all public services 
including those provided by local authorities, and for national economic 
objectives. Neither local government nor local taxpayers are in a 
position to assess either the relative claims of local services as a 
whole to national resources or the overall economic impact of local 
expenditure. These are matters on which the government must take a 
strategic view in the course of its management of economic policy. For 
these reasons it is essential that the Government should be able to 
influence local revenue". This is the view of the present government, 
expressed in its Green Paper on "Alternatives to Domestic Rates" 
December 1981 (Cmnd 8449, paragraph 1-11). 
Such a view of the responsibilities of central government has in fact 
been shared by many previous incumbents. The points of divergence from 
other governments lie in the emphasis given to the effects of both the 
relative claims of local services and their economic impact. First, the 
present government believes that public expenditure is primarily at the 
*The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of 
the Fraser of Allander Institute. 
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expense of private expenditure which is "crowded-out" as a consequence 
of the public sector's prior claim on resources via either taxation or 
borrowing.3 Hence public expenditure does not lead to a real growth in 
national product, rather it merely produces a redistribution between the 
two sectors. Furthermore, in that economic growth is generated by the 
private sector, the overburgeoning public sector starves the private 
sector of resources hence leading to a diminution of growth potential. 
Secondly, the economic impact of the taxation and borrowing necessary to 
support the public sector is analysed in terms of the so-called 
"monetarist view" namely the effect on the money supply, interest rates, 
investment and inflation. Such views are, of course, subject to 
considerable controversy. The purpose of this paper is not to add to 
that debate but rather, taking the present government's view as given, 
explain^and analyse the recent events pertaining to local government 
finance. 
As officially defined, public expenditure as a whole has consistely 
comprised more than two fifth^ of the UK's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
standing at 43.5? in 1980/81.-> Of the total public expenditure out-
turn of £93.5 billion in 1980/81, central government accounted for £67.7 
billion and local government some £25.1 billion (Table 1). Local 
government spending is dominated by current expenditure which accounts 
for four fifths of the total (Table 2). 
TABLE 1 CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: 
1976-77 1980-81 
£ million cash: UK Outturn Outturn 
Central Government 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1981-82 1982-83 
Estimated 
Outturn Plans 
Total central government excluding 
adjustments 
Local Authorities 
Agriculture, fisheries, food and 
forestry 
Industry, energy, trade and 
employment 
Transport 
Housing 
Other environmental services 
Law, order and protective services 
Education and science, arts and 
libraries 
Health and personal social services 
Social security 
Scotland 
Wales 
Northern Ireland 
Total local authorities excluding 
adjustments 
Planning total 
36,498 67,701 
77 169 
77,819 
186 
84,127 
210 
Source: 
67 
1 ,241 
2,214 
1,429 
1,290 
5,783 
902 
206 
1,678 
713 
212 
15,812 
54,649 
131 
1,990 
2,007 
2,568 
2,380 
9,495 
1,697 
370 
2,791 
1,103 
407 
25,109 
93,475 
Cmnd 8494 
167 
2,069 
1,313 
2,557 
2,778 
10,346 
1,876 
577 
2,986 
1,149 
467 
26,471 
106,130 
187 
2,146 
1,677 
2,764 
3,042 
10,447 
1,962 
662 
3,188 
1,249 
502 
28,036 
115,150 
Note: Data for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland includes only 
expenditure by local authorities themselves. Expenditures by 
the respective Secretaries of State on their own account 
together with expenditures which are the responsibility of 
other Ministers are excluded. 
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TABLE 2 SELECTED PUBLIC EXPENDITURE BY SPENDING 
AUTHORITY AND ECONOMIC CATEGORY 
£ million cash: UK 
Central Government 
Current: 
Goods and services 
Subsidies and grants 
Capital: 
Goods and services 
Grants 
Net lending to nationalised indus-
tries and some public corporations 
Other net lending and capital 
transactions 
Total excluding debt interest 
and other adjustments 
Local Authorities 
Current: 
Goods and services 
Subsidies and grants 
Capital: 
Goods and services 
Grants 
Net lending and other capital 
transactions 
Total excluding debt interest 
and other adjustments 
Planning Total 
1976-77 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
Estimated 
outturn outturn outturn plans 
15,892 
16,676 
1,363 
1 ,292 
404 
871 
29,473 
32,159 
1 ,866 
1,920 
2,778 
- 496 
33,616 
37,455 
2,202 
2,048 
1,964 
534 
36,328 
41 ,871 
2,421 
1,876 
1 ,211 
420 
36,498 67,701 77,819 
61 
15,812 
54,649 
311 
25,109 
93,475 
691 
26,471 
106,130 
84,127 
10,541 
1 ,102 
4,016 
92 
18,351 
2,327 
3,929 
190 
20,249 
2,720 
2,559 
252 
21 ,230 
2,520 
2,781 
399 
1 ,106 
28,036 
115,150 
Source: Cmnd 8494 
Within this the education service accounts for over half (Table 3). 
Capital expenditure is relatively small (Table 2), usually with over 
two-fifths being spent on the Housing Service (Table 3). Current 
expenditure itself is primarily on wages and salaries which account for 
over three quarters (Table 4). Unlike central government expenditure, 
which is dominated by subsidies and grants, local government 
expenditures are almost wholly incurred on goods and services (Table 2). 
In seeking to reduce the relative importance of public expenditure in 
terms of GDP, central government must be able to exercise effective 
control over local government expenditure. The present economic 
recession has led to an increase in central government's payments of 
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TABLE 3 PUBLIC EXPENDITURE BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN GREAT BRITAIN 
£ million cash 
Current Exenditure 
Education and science, arts and libraries 
Local environmental services 
Law, order and protective services 
Personal social services 
Transport 
Housing 
Other Programmes 
Total (current) 
Capital Expenditure 
Education and science, arts 
Local environmental services 
Law, order and protective services 
Personal social services 
Transport 
Housing 
Other Programmes 
Total (capital) 
Total (capital and current) 
1980-81 
Outturn 
10,580 
2,391 
2,552 
1 ,900 
1 ,658 
646 
598 
1981-82 
Estimated 
Outturn 
11 ,646 
2,610 
2,926 
2,146 
1 ,806 
573 
846 
1982-83 
Plants 
11 ,926 
2,717 
3,218 
2,223 
1,758 
503 
957 
20,324 22,553 23,302 
and libraries 
Source: Cmnd 
597 
886 
64 
96 
798 
1 ,810 
126 
4,377 
24,701 
8494 
488 
662 
113 
88 
765 
1,189 
146 
3,451 
26,004 
427 
805 
127 
127 
922 
1,657 
166 
4,231 
27,533 
TABLE >\ PROPORTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES IN MAJOR SERVICES 
Service 
Total 
Central Government 
Local Government 
Police 
Education 
Social Services 
1972 
65.9 
55.1 
82.2 
89.1 
78.6 
70.6 
1971 
I 
65.5 
55.7 
80.6 
89.7 
78.1 
67.4 
1976 
65.1 
54.8 
80.4 
87.1 
80.7 
66.2 
1978 
62.9 
52.8 
78.2 
84.1 
79.4 
65.1 
1980 
62.0 
51.9 
78.2 
85.9 
77.1 
68.0 
Source: National Income and Expenditure Blue Book, 1981 
Taken From: Public Money, June 1982, p6. 
Note: Proportions are of net current expenditure for the UK. 
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grants and subsidies, for example, in the form of increased payments of 
unemployment benefit and social security, simultaneous with a loss of 
tax revenue. Given the predominance of goods and services in local 
government expenditures, a reduction in such expenditures could be used 
to offset the automatic increase in grants and subsidies paid out by 
central government. However, the predominance of labour costs in local 
government spending implies that such a reduction would require 
substantial redundancies to the extent that they could not be achieved 
through natural wastage (ie retirement and resignations). The 
Education Service provides great scope for such manpower reductions, 
being by far the largest single service, having the highest proportion 
of labour costs after the Police Service (which is actually planned to 
increase in size) and currently experiencing a major decline in pupil 
numbers due to demographic trends.' 
Examination of the breakdown of local authority expenditure in Scotland 
reveals a picture similar to that for Britain as a whole (Table 5). 
Local authority current and capital expenditure accounts for over half 
of all expenditure within the programme of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland. He has direct cash control over capital expenditure (again a 
very small proportion of total spending) but no direct control over 
current expenditure. This arises because British local government has 
its own revenue raising powers and, in the extreme case, could offset 
any grant reductions by increasing its income from indigenous sources, 
especially local rates. This would require significant rate increases 
given that the grant subsidy is equal to more than half of local 
expenditure in total and some two-thirds of Scottish expenditure 
relevant for grant purposes (Table 6). 
Various governments have in fact managed to reduce real total local 
government spending since 1975, even before adopting new powers (Table 
7). However, such cuts have primarily been achieved by reducing the 
capital expenditures of Scottish local authorities by 40$ in real terms 
between 1975-76 and 1980-81. This may result in an imbalance between 
current and capital expenditures, assuming an optimal ratio between 
present and future consumption exists. Furthermore, a continuing 
reduction in capital expenditures will ultimately exhaust central 
government's ability to offset what it regards as excessive current 
expenditure by local government. 
The 1982 Public Expenditure White Paper (Cmnd 8494) reviews the degree 
to which plans for public expenditure in Scotland published in the 1981 
White Paper (Cmnd 8175) were met. It states that local authority 
capital expenditure in 1980-81 was lower than planned whilst current 
expenditure on services relevant for grant (excluding housing) was 41 
greater than planned. An even greater overspend was budgeted for 1981-
82 by local authorities and hence the Secretary of State took selective 
action under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) 
Act 1981 together with a general abatement of grant in an attempt to 
reduce the excess of actual spending over central government's plans. 
The macro-economic implications of "excessive" local government 
expenditures can be considered separately for capital and for current 
expenditure. Capital expenditure is almost wholly financed by 
borrowing, the predominant source being central government via the 
Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) which accounted for over half of total 
borrowings in 1980/81. This may have implications for the growth of 
the money supply. 
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TABLE 5 LOCAL AUTHORITY EXPENDITURE IN SCOTLAND 
2 
6 
98 
36 
175 
117 
604 
110 
17 
21 
2 
11 
235 
83 
340 
222 
1 ,062 
193 
41 
34 
2 
13 
215 
102 
327 
247 
1,107 
239 
64 
37 
2 
13 
235 
71 
370 
289 
1,211 
262 
75 
41 
£ million cash 1976-77 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
Current Expenditure 
Agriculture, fisheries, food and 
forestry 
Industry, energy, trade and employment 
Transport 
Housing 
Other environmental services 
Law, order and protective services 
Education and science, arts and 
libraries 
Health and social work 
Housing benefitC*) 
Other public services 
Total Current Expenditure (PES basis) 1,186 2,223 2,352 2,569 
Capital Expenditure 
Agriculture, fisheries, food and 
forestry 
Industry, energy, trade and employment 
Transport 
Housing 
Other environmental services 
Law, order and protective services 
Education and science, arts and 
libraries 
Health and social work 
Total Capital Expenditure (PES basis) 530 621 710 706 
(*) The figures reflect expenditure on rent rebates and allowances 
Source: Cmnd 8494 
If the government sells debt to the banking sector then reserve assets 
held by the commercial banks increase and, for a given reserve asset 
ratio (ie the ratio between reserve assets and eligible liabilities, or 
basically deposits), allows a multiple expansion of deposits. About 
85% of the money supply as officially defined is made up of bank 
deposits. An increased money stock is held to lead to higher prices 
through adjustment of holdings of financial and real assets, whereby 
prices of the latter would rise as the private sector attempts to reduce 
its now surplus holdings of money.* The expansion of the money supply 
consequent upon local authority borrowing from the PWLB assumes no 
offsetting variation by the government (through the Bank of England) in 
the reserve-asset ratio, that banks do in fact expand deposits by 
granting loans and overdrafts and, more fundamentally, that the reserve-
asset ratio is effective in controlling the expansion of credit.'® 
The relevance of such a possibility is further diminished by the sources 
of central government borrowing, which forms part of the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). This is subdivided between the own 
1 
-
83 
220 
123 
10 
82 
11 
2 
-
102 
260 
166 
13 
65 
13 
3 
1 
148 
280 
180 
14 
69 
15 
2 
2 
133 
306 
167 
15 
65 
16 
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a c c o u n t b o r r o w i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s of c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t , p u b l i c 
c o r p o r a t i o n s and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . For four of t h e f i v e y e a r s up to 
and inc luding 1980/81 the re was a net redemption of Treasury B i l l s ( i e 
t h e Bank of England redeemed more than i t s o l d ) , i s s u e s of G i l t s 
a c c o u n t i n g f o r a t l e a s t t w o - t h i r d s and a t most 100J of PSBR. 
Furthermore, the non-bank p r i v a t e sec to r (eg pension funds) had already 
become t h e major sou rce of f i n a n c e for the PSBR by 1970 and accounted 
for 70% by 1980/81. 
TABLE 6 LOCAL AUTHORITY EXPENDITURE IN GREAT BRITAIN 
RELEVANT FOR RATE SUPPORT IN 1981-82 
Current expenditure (PES definition) 
of which 
Relevant current expenditure(1) 
Relevant current expenditure 
Rate fund contributions to Housing 
Revenue Accounts 
Revenue contributions to capital 
expenditure 
Loan charges 
Interest receipts 
Total relevant expenditure 
of which 
Aggregate Exchequer Grant 
At a rate of(3) 
of which 
Block Grant(4) (cash limited) 
Other cash limited grants(5) 
Domestic Rate relief grant(6) 
Specific grants not cash limited(7) 
Great 
England Scotland Wales Britain 
£ million, 1980 survey prices 
13,016 1,689 819 15,523 
12,130 1,633 772 14,535 
£ million, estimated outturn prices 
16,180 2,195(2) 1,032 19,407 
254 11 265 
582 
1,674 
- 267 
18,423 
10,895 
59.U 
8,364 
421 
663 
1,447 . 
19 
408 
- 10 
2,612 
1 ,742 
66.1% 
1,583 
14 
145 
50 
108 
- 15 
1,187 
871 
73.4% 
697 
41 
48 
85 
651 
2,190 
- 292 
22,221 
13,508 
10,644 
462 
725 
1,677 
Notes: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Relevant current expenditure is that part of local authority current 
expenditure as defined for this White Paper which is included in 
relevant expenditure for RSG purposes. The main differences are that 
relevant current expenditure excludes certain items met almost entirely 
from central government funds such as expenditure on mandatory student 
awards and expenditure met by central government grants for rent 
rebates and allowances. 
Unlike RSG in England and Wales, RSG in Scotland is not paid at 
estimate outturn prices. This column shows the figures implied by the 
cash limit on Scottish RSG. 
This is consistent with an overall rate of grant support of 60J in 
England and Wales. 
In Scotland, the cash limited part of Rate Support Grant. 
In England and Wales, Transport Supplementary Grant and National Parks 
Supplementary Grant. 
Named the Domestic Element in Scotland. 
Law and order services account for three-quarters of expenditure met by 
these grants. 
Source: Cmnd 8175 
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TABLE 7 LOCAL AUTHORITY EXPENDITURE IN SCOTLAND 
8 
167 
72 
292 
196 
875 
141 
27 
10 
171 
59 
270 
200 
812 
180 
30 
10 
166 
61 
252 
200 
792 
181 
26 
130 
386 
224 
18 
114 
12 
107 
210 
132 
12 
58 
12 
97 
235 
131 
11 
50 
11 
£ million at 1980 survey prices 1975-76 1980-81 1981-82 
Current Expenditure 
Agriculture, fisheries, food and forestry -
Industry, energy trade and employment 
Transport 
Housing 
Other environmental services 
Law, order and protective services 
Education and science, arts and libraries 
Health and personal social services 
Other public services 
Total current expenditure (PES basis) 1,777 1,733 1,689 
Capital Expenditure 
Agriculture, fisheries, food and forestry 1 2 2 
Industry, energy trade and employment - -
Transport 
Housing 
Other environmental services 
Law, order and protective services 
Education and science, arts and libraries 
Health and personal social services 
Total capital expenditure (PES basis) 885 532 537 
Source: Cmnd 8175 
TABLE 8 THE EROSION OF RATE SUPPORT GRANT IN SCOTLAND 
Actual Grant as % of Actual grant as % of 
Official Grant % Relevant Expenditure Near-Actual Expenditure 
75.4% 71.0% 
70.8% 70.6% 
68.2% 70.5% 
68.2% 67.6% 
64.5% 64.6% 
64.5% 62.1% 
Source: Hansard, 19 February 1981, cols 213-214 
(updated from unpublished sources) 
Notes: The figures are at outturn prices and include loan charges. From 
1976-77, the amounts of aggregate grants have been restricted by 
the operation of cash limits. The actual grant percentages for 
1981-82 and 1982-83 could be as much as 5 percentage points below 
the official percentages. 
Taken From: The Government's Economic Strategy: The C0SLA Critique, 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, Edinburgh, May 1981 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
75.0% 
72.5% 
68.5% 
68.5% 
68.5% 
68.5% 
66.7% 
64.2% 
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This reflected the increasing attention given to growth of the money 
stock as an objective of policy under "Competition and Credit Control" 
introduced in 1971. Greater control over the broad money aggregates 
was sought, rather than over just the lending of specific types of 
financial institutions (ie the clearing banks). In addition the new 
system was intended to stimulate competition in banking and other 
financial markets. Hence the growth of credit and the money stock 
would be controlled by interest rates and the allocation of credit would 
be determined by the rates that different types of borrowers were 
prepared to pay. There was therefore a shift from direct controls (eg 
lending ceilings) to reliance on market forces. The two main 
instruments intended to achieve this were changes in the Bank of 
England's Minimum Lending Rate and open-market operations. 
Other things being equal, sales of gilt-edged securities to pension 
funds or borrowing directly from individuals via National Savings will 
cause them to run down their bank deposits so reducing the money supply. 
Other things were not always equal, however, since whilst over the 
longer term the Bank of England was able to sell government securities 
to the non-bank private sector, the timing of sales sometimes caused 
problems. This arose due to the unwillingness of investors in gilt-
edged securities to buy when they expected interest rates to rise (ie 
prices of government securities to fall). This was particularly the 
case when growth of the money supply appeared excessive and in such 
cases the government was often forced to borrow temporarily from the 
banking sector via the issue of Treasury Bills. Hence an unduly large 
borrowing requirement by, or on behalf of, local authorities could still 
have implications for the growth of the money supply.11 It could also 
have implications for the level of interest rates since in order to 
induce investors to purchase an excess supply of bills their prices have 
to be reduced, with the result that, since a fixed cash payment is 
commanded by each bill, the interest rate rises. This could be 
detrimental in that higher interest rates may tend to dissuade 
investment in industry and in house construction, and could also lead to 
instability in the exchange rate and/or balance of payments as foreign 
funds are attracted by the now higher interest rates. This assumes a 
high degree of interest-elasticity of investment and of foreign funds 
and ignores other factors such as expectations of profits to be derived 
from investment. 
While the foregoing text has analysed the macro-economic implications of 
borrowing to finance capital expenditures, these arguments have not 
formed the prime justification for controlling such spending by Scottish 
local government. Rather, its reduction has been used to offset 
central government's lack of effective control over current expenditure, 
both for local government as a whole and as a punitive measure against 
individual authorities. Indeed it has already been noted that capital 
spending was lower than planned by central government in 1980/81. 
The macro-economic implications of "excessive" current expenditures are 
held to work primarily through local rate bills. The latter 
have recently been subject to particular publicity in terms of their 
effects on business profits, rising from 16$ of (non-North Sea) gross 
trading profits in 1973 to 52$ in 1980. Non-domestic rates are only a 
small proportion of costs but they have to be paid irrespective of 
profit levels. However, over 20$ of these are paid by the public 
sector itself and non-domestic rates are an allowable expense against 
corporation and other company taxes. Furthermore, businesses do 
receive services from local authorities which they would otherwise have 
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to pay for directly, and the theory of tax incidence would suggest that 
some of the burden is passed on in higher prices. Domestic rates 
cannot be passed on and hence could lead to inflationary wage claims. 
This is reinforced by the inclusion of rate payments in the Retail Price 
Index upon which wage claims tend to be based. In addition, if grant 
reductions are offset by higher rate bills then central government will 
be less able to achieve its twin objectives of reducing income tax 
levels (rates being a form of direct taxation) and reducing public 
expenditure at the same time. 3 Given the predominance of current 
expenditure in total spending central government must be able to control 
rate levels if it is to achieve its objectives. 
This explains the adoption of new powers by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland under the 1981 Act, referred to earlier. It should, however, 
be noted that the Secretary of State has had powers to reduce the grant 
of individual authorities since the Local Government (Scotland) Act 
1966. Under that Act he could reduce grant going to those authorities 
whose actual expenditure was deemed to be excessive and unreasonable. 
The 1981 Act extended those powers from actual to estimated expenditure 
so that action could be taken before, rather than after, an overspend. 
Such excessive expenditure is judged with respect to guidelines 
published by the Scottish Office and having regard to the expenditure 
levels of comparable authorities, general economic conditions and any 
other criteria the Secretary of State considers appropriate. Such 
comparisons are, of course, subject to considerable controversy. 
Scottish authorities could do little to offset such grant reductions 
immediately. Firstly, they cannot use sums from their loans fund to 
finance current expenditure for which grant has been withdrawn. 
Secondly, they are prohibited from levying supplementary rate increases 
during the course of the financial year. Increases in fees and charges 
are also impractical in the short-term and, besides, they are anathema 
for many authorities, although central government has recently passed 
enabling legislation for authorities to raise more income from this 
source. Hence, if individual authorities are determined to maintain 
expenditure levels in opposition to central government wishes, they must 
formulate speculative budgets, setting their rate poundage levels 
sufficiently high to offset any future grant reduction. Any general 
reduction in grant is announced several months prior to the financial 
year to which it relates. Hence authorities could budget to cover such 
a general loss of grant, if they so wished. However, it would be much 
more difficult to budget in advance of selective action directed against 
individual authorities during the course of the financial year after 
budgets have been prepared. Furthermore, these powers assume that, if a 
clear trade-off between reduced grant and increased rate bills for an 
individual authority was apparent, it is unlikely that a local authority 
would openly defy central government policy at the expense of the 
ratepayer. This assumption has not always been borne out, and in 
practice the effectiveness of the-1981 Act's powers of selective grant 
withdrawal would appear to be limited. In June 1981 the Secretary of 
State asked for a total reduction of £63 million from seven Scottish 
local authorities. Selective action under the 1981 Act yielded only 
£33.7 million and only after considerable publicity and airing of views 
opposed to the government (eg the Lothian Region case). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the government adopted new powers under the 
Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act 1982. In addition to his 
previously existing powers, the Secretary of State can now also propose 
a reduction in the rate determined by an individual local authority. 
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He may a l s o , a t any t ime a f t e r the es t imated aggregate amount of grant 
(namely the Rate Support Grant) has been fixed for any year , redetermine 
t h e amount for t h a t y e a r . This l a t t e r power w i l l s e r v e to reduce the 
a b i l i t y of l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s as a group t o engage in s p e c u l a t i v e 
b u d g e t i n g . The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e can now e n f o r c e a r e d u c t i o n in 
e x p e n d i t u r e a f t e r budge t s have been s e t s imply by r e d e t e r m i n i n g ( i e 
r e d u c i n g ) a g g r e g a t e c u r r e n t e x p e n d i t u r e . The o t h e r power ( c a l l e d 
" ra te-capping") a l lows the Secretary of S ta t e to con t ro l the r a t e income 
of i n d i v i d u a l a u t h o r i t i e s in a d d i t i o n , s u b j e c t to t he approva l of the 
House of Commons. Hence , he can a l s o e n f o r c e a r e d u c t i o n of 
expendi ture of an ind iv idua l au tho r i t y as wel l as of a l l a u t h o r i t i e s in 
a g g r e g a t e . These powers would appear to g i v e t he S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e 
a l m o s t t o t a l c o n t r o l over the incomes and hence e x p e n d i t u r e s of l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s . Such powers may prove unwieldy in t h e i r implementat ion, 
however, e s p e c i a l l y where House of Commons approval i s r equ i r ed . 
Two ques t ions a r i s e : f i r s t l y , whether such c o n t r o v e r s i a l new powers are 
r e a l l y necessary to con t ro l aggregate expenditure and, secondly, whether 
they are in abrogat ion of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t of l oca l government 
to determine i t s own l eve l of expendi ture . The f i r s t quest ion s t r i c t l y 
concerns the economist. The reader must form h i s or her own judgement 
on t h e s e c o n d . I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e s y s t e m of c a s h l i m i t s on 
e x p e n d i t u r e , i n t r o d u c e d in 1976, have f a i l e d to c o n t r o l c u r r e n t 
spending. Under the annual Public Expenditure Survey (PESC) an upper 
l i m i t was placed on the compensation for i n f l a t i o n during the course of 
t he f o r t h c o m i n g f i n a n c i a l y e a r . Since a c t u a l i n f l a t i o n was g r e a t e r 
than f o r e c a s t du r ing the l a t e r 1970's t h i s se rved to reduce g r a n t paid 
to l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s in r e a l t e r m s , compounding t h e r e d u c t i o n in t he 
o f f i c i a l g r a n t p e r c e n t a g e . For Sco t l and t h i s r e s u l t e d in t he a c t u a l 
g r a n t be ing 4% p o i n t s below the o f f i c i a l g r a n t in 1979/80 and 1980/81 
( T a b l e 8 ) . L o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s were a b l e t o m a i n t a i n c u r r e n t 
expendi tures with t h e i r own r a t e income. However, whi l s t cash l i m i t s 
were not o r i g i n a l l y des igned as a means of r e d u c i n g the volume of 
s e rv i ce s below approved l e v e l s they are now being so used by thepresent 
government as pa r t of i t s cash ( r a t h e r than volume) planning of publ ic 
e x p e n d i t u r e . The l a t e s t P u b l i c E x p e n d i t u r e White Paper (Cmnd 8494) 
a l l o w s fo r annual ne t i n c r e a s e s in cash t e rms for S c o t t i s h l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t y t o t a l spending of 6% in 1982/83 and 3.5% in each of the two 
f o l l o w i n g y e a r s . I f i n f l a t i o n i s g r e a t e r than t h e s e f i g u r e s then i t 
i m p l i e s a r e a l r e d u c t i o n in s p e n d i n g , i f r a t e l e v e l s a r e s u c c e s s f u l l y 
con t ro l l ed by means of the new powers. 
Nonetheless , the cons t ra ined nature of the new powers means t h a t i t i s 
s t i l l t he case t h a t " r e fo rms of t he g r a n t system have been des igned to 
p r o v i d e c l e a r e r i n c e n t i v e s to prudence U l t i m a t e l y , however, the 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a l l such measures depends on l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s ' own 
sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y towards t h e i r ra tepayers and towards na t iona l 
needs". (Cmnd 8449, paragraph 1.13) Hence macro-economic con t ro l via 
l o c a l government e x p e n d i t u r e may remain i m p r e c i s e . Indeed , the 
e s t i m a t e for B r i t i s h l oca l au tho r i t y cur ren t expenditure in 1982-83 in 
the 1982 White Paper was £1.3 b i l l i o n higher than the cash f igures based 
on the 1981 White Paper (see Cmnd 8494-1, paragraph 47). 
Local Government Finance as an Instrument of Equa l i sa t ion 
The g r a n t sys tem as a whole i s based on t h e concep t of e q u i t y . In 
p a r t i c u l a r , many l o c a l government s e r v i c e s a r e e i t h e r p u b l i c goods or 
m e r i t goods where e q u i t y d i c t a t e s t h a t such s e r v i c e s should be made 
a v a i l a b l e to a l l pe r sons a t an e q u a l i s e d c o s t , r a t h e r than being 
a l loca t ed by the p r i ce mechanism.14 Hence c e n t r a l government g ran t s to 
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l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s a t t empt to compensate for v a r i a t i o n s in t h e i r need to 
spend per c a p i t a in providing comparable l e v e l s of s e r v i c e s and a l so for 
v a r i a t i o n s in t h e i r l o c a l per cap i t a t axab l e capac i ty . Var i a t ions in 
the need to spend per head of popula t ion w i l l a r i s e , for example, i f an 
a u t h o r i t y has a r e l a t i v e l y h igh p r o p o r t i o n of c h i l d r e n of compulsory 
s c h o o l age in i t s p o p u l a t i o n . Even i f i t spends t he same amount per 
p u p i l as o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s i t w i l l n o n e t h e l e s s spend more per head of 
popu la t ion . This would impose a r e l a t i v e l y high cos t on r a t e p a y e r s in 
such an a u t h o r i t y and hence the grant system a t t empts to compensate for 
d i f f e r e n c e s in the need to spend per head of popu la t ion . 
S i m i l a r l y t h e uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n of d o m e s t i c and n o n - d o m e s t i c 
p r o p e r t i e s throughout the country , upon which the l o c a l tax or r a t e i s 
l e v i e d , r e s u l t s i n a u t h o r i t i e s h a v i n g d i f f e r i n g l o c a l t a x a b l e 
c a p a c i t i e s . Areas wi th r e l a t i v e l y low taxab le c a p a c i t i e s would have to 
levy r e l a t i v e l y high tax r a t e s on l o c a l r a t epaye r s in order to f inance 
l e v e l s of s e r v i c e s comparable with o ther a u t h o r i t i e s . This would, a t 
t h e m a r g i n , e n c o u r a g e m i g r a t i o n of m o b i l e r a t e p a y e r s from poor (h igh 
t a x ) a r e a s to p r o s p e r o u s (low t a x ) a r e a s . Hence, a sys tem of l o c a l 
government f inance based so l e ly on l o c a l t a x a t i o n would accen tua te such 
d i s p a r i t i e s , poor a r e a s be ing made poo re r by o u t - m i g r a t i o n and v i c e 
versa . Economic and demographic dec l i ne in c e r t a i n c i t i e s and reg ions 
would be exacerba ted . The B r i t i s h system of l o c a l government f inance 
t h e r e f o r e i n c o r p o r a t e s a r eg ime of c e n t r a l government g r a n t s t o l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h t h e s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e of c o m p e n s a t i n g b o t h f o r 
v a r i a t i o n s in l o c a l t a x a b l e r e s o u r c e s per head of p o p u l a t i o n and 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f o r v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e need t o spend p e r head of 
popula t ion in providing a comparable s tandard of s e r v i c e . ^ The main 
i n s t rumen t s for payment of c e n t r a l government g ran t a re the Rate Support 
Grant (RSG) and Spec i f i c and Supplementary Grants (Table 6 ) . These are 
pa id in r e s p e c t of " r e l e v a n t e x p e n d i t u r e " ( i e r e l e v a n t fo r g r a n t 
p u r p o s e s ) which i n c l u d e s most c u r r e n t e x p e n d i t u r e and f i n a n c e fo r 
c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e . ' " Whi ls t t he r e are d i f f e rences between Scotland 
and t h e r e s t of B r i t a i n in t e r m s of t he a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t he g r a n t 
mechanism, the under ly ing o b j e c t i v e s are the same. 
The RSG i s , as i t s name i m p l i e s , a g r a n t in s u p p o r t of t he l o c a l r a t e s , 
whereby t h e l o c a l r a t e p a y e r s a r e spa r ed t h e f u l l burden of f i n a n c i n g 
l o c a l e x p e n d i t u r e . In S c o t l a n d t h i s i s d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e e l e m e n t s . 
The "Needs Element" compensates l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s for d i f f e rence in the 
need t o spend pe r head of p o p u l a t i o n . The "Resources Element" 
c o m p e n s a t e s fo r d i f f e r e n c e s in l o c a l t a x a b l e r e s o u r c e s (namely t he 
r a t e a b l e value of domest ic and non-domestic h e r e d i t a m e n t s ) , again per 
head of popu la t ion . The "Domestic Element" was o r i g i n a l l y in t roduced 
as a t e m p o r a r y s u b s i d y to d o m e s t i c r a t e p a y e r s so as to a l l e v i a t e t h e 
acknowledged a n o m a l i e s of t h e r a t i n g sys tem b u t has in f a c t become 
permanent. I t i s paid d i r e c t to r a t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s which then pass on 
the b e n e f i t to domest ic r a t e p a y e r s by reducing domestic r a t e poundages 
( i e t h e t ax r a t e ) by a c o r r e s p o n d i n g amount . I t s s h a r e of t o t a l RSG 
i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t . ' Th i s t r i p a r t i t e g r a n t s t r u c t u r e was i n t r o d u c e d 
i n to B r i t a i n as a whole in 1967 al though i t has r ecen t ly been modified 
for England and Wales. 
The t o t a l s i z e of t h e Needs E l e m e n t i s more t h a n s u f f i c i e n t t o 
compensa te fo r d i f f e r e n c e s in t he need to spend per head and hence t h e 
r e s i d u a l i s d i s t r i b u t e d on a per c a p i t a b a s i s , r e s u l t i n g in c e n t r a l 
government t a k i n g on a l a r g e r s h a r e of t he c o s t of l o c a l s e r v i c e s t han 
i s necessary simply for the purpose of e q u a l i s a t i o n . " By c o n t r a s t the 
Resou rces Element does no t a c h i e v e c o m p l e t e r e s o u r c e s e q u a l i s a t i o n 
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t h e enhance^ent^of 
size of the Needs Element is more than sufficient to compensate for 
differences in need to spend per head of population. However, as the 
proportion of relevant expenditure funded by grants is reduced this will 
tend to reduce the size of the Needs Element until ultimately it is not 
sufficient to compensate for such differences in need at existing 
expenditure levels. The government could argue that it would be 
sufficient if local authorities reduced their expenditures in line with 
its plans. However, to the extent that all local authorities maintain 
current expenditures by placing an increasing burden on the ratepayer 
then such compensation ultimately will no longer be complete. 
Conclusions 
Whilst the provision and financing of local government services was 
originally intended to achieve greater equality in the consumption of 
national output it has increasingly been used as a macro-economic tool to 
control the level of aggregate demand. In the postwar period up to the 
early 1970's local government expenditure accounted for an increasing share 
of GDP. In a period of rising expenditures local government finance was 
able to serve both as a macro-economic tool (ie increasing aggregate demand 
to maintain full employment) and as an instrument of equalisation in the 
consumption and finance of public services. More recently its use as a 
macro-economic tool has been directed to cutting public expenditure. A 
diminishing real grant, together with other changes in the internal 
structure of the grant regime, creates a danger that equalisation may no 
longer be achieved. If central government wishes to achieve both 
macroeconomic control and equalisation then there must be changes made to 
the internal structure of the Scottish grant regime. The Needs and 
Resources Elements could be combined into a unitary grant. This would 
allow for complete resources equalisation with a lower grant total simply by 
applying negative resources grants to high resource authorities. When 
unified with the needs grant this process would still yield positive net 
grants. The separate "Block Grants" for England and Wales have recently 
adopted this unitary structure. 
Such changes would ensure continuing equalisation with a smaller grant 
total. In addition, to the extent that rate levels are successfully 
controlled by the new legislation, macro-economic control will also have 
been achieved. However, it could be argued that such micro-economic 
controls over individual local authorities are not necessary for macro-
economic purposes. Rather than being the logical outcome of a series of 
assumptions about the functioning of the economy (ie the monetarist view), 
it could be argued that the recent attempts to curtail the budgetary freedom 
of local authorities are the result of purely political ideology. This 
ideology is characterised by antipathy towards the public sector in general, 
holding the view that individuals should be free of state control and free 
to spend their income as they think fit, rather than as decreed by central 
or local governments. 
Many parts of the public sector are currently being "privatised".^ For 
local government, recent measures include the contracting out of refuse 
disposal and council house sales. Such decisions are the responsibility of 
individual authorities and hence progress towards privatisation in the 
short-run is likely to be limited. However,in the long-run, central 
government could introduce privatisation into further and higher education 
falling within the responsibility of local government, or a voucher system 
for compulsory school education with directly elected school boards. 
Whilst unlikely in the near future, such developments would be feasible in 
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the longer-term under a re-elected Thatcher government. Hence, as a short-
term measure central government is simply trying to reduce the spending of 
the local government sector in general, and of those authorities with 
opposing political ideologies in particular. The newly legislated powers 
have cast doubt on the future constitutional autonomy of local government. 
In following such a course the next logical steps are for central government 
to tell local authorities what they should spend on individual services 
(rather than on services as a whole) and to deprive all authorities of their 
independent sources of income (namely the rates). When that happens local 
government will be transformed into a local agency system for central 
government. In the longer-term even this agency function may be downgraded 
if major services such as education are privatised. 
NOTES 
1. The new powers relating to Scotland and the steps taken against 
individual authorities are described in "A time to listen - a time to 
speak out" Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, February 1982. 
2. Equalisation is in respect of different local authorities rather than 
individuals. This is explained more fully in Section B. 
3. Standard economic textbooks usually adopt the Keynesian view, assuming 
that all government expenditure represents a net addition to aggregate 
demand (ie the crowding-out effect is zero). In this case government 
expenditures would have a major impact on output and employment. 
4. Persons not familiar with that debate will find a useful summary in PM 
Jackson, The Public Expenditure Cuts: Rationale and Consequences, 
Fiscal Studies, Vol 1 No 2, March 1980 pp66-82. 
5. The definition of public expenditure is essentially arbitrary. The 
official definition excludes such items as the capital expenditures of 
the nationalised industries. 
6. The Treasury's Economic Progress Report No 130, February 1981 estimated 
that the cost to the Exchequer of rising unemployment in 1980-81 was 
£340 million for an increase of 100,000 in the number of people out of 
work. Unofficial estimates are provided by A W Dilnot and C N Morris 
"The Exchequer Costs of Unemployment" Fiscal Studies, Vol 2 No 3, 
November 1981. 
7. The latest forecasts of Scottish pupil numbers are contained in the 
Scottish Education Department's Statistical Bulletin, No 7/B2/1981, 
July 1981. 
8. A useful discussion of capital and current public expenditure is 
provided by the Treasury's Economic Progress Report, No 135, July 1981. 
9. This view of the Transmission Mechanism is expounded in theTreasury's 
Economic Progress Report, No 123, July 1980. It holds to the belief 
that money is broadly neutral in the longer term, in that any reduction 
in its supply affects the price level rather than real economic 
activity, temporary effects notwithstanding. 
10. Many of the same qualifications hold for direct borrowing by local 
authorities from the banking sector, from overseas (subject to Treasury 
consent) or from the public at large (via deposits or bonds). 
11. Nonetheless research has revealed that "less than half of the variance 
in the change in the money supply between 1963 and 1978 is accounted 
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f o r s t a t i s t i c a l l y by t h e PSBR": S a v a g e , D M o n e t a r y T a r g e t s and t h e 
C o n t r o l of t h e Money S u p p l y , N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e Economic Review, No 8 9 , 
Augus t 1 9 7 9 . 
Whilst evidence from the United States suggests that investment is 
sensitive to interest rates, there is no clear evidence for Britain. 
The apparent lack of sensitivity in Britain may be due to a mis-
specification of research (eg the lack of disaggregation between types 
of investment, the use of nominal rather than real interest rates, the 
lack of attention paid to the trade cycle) or it may be due to 
institutional factors such as the fact that public corporations have 
accounted for as much as a fifth of UK fixed investment (1976) and they 
are known not to be sensitive to interest rates when undertaking 
investment. 
The importance of domestic rates should not be over-emphasised, 
however, since they constitute less than 3? of personal disposable 
income. Nonetheless, this porportion could rise dramatically in the 
future if the financing burden is switched from central to local 
taxation. 
In his book, The Strategy of Equality: Redistribution and the Social 
Services (1982), J Le Grand casts doubt upon the effectiveness of 
public services in general, and local government services in 
particular, in allocating such services equally to all classes in 
society. 
In his book, "Equalisation and the Future of Local Government", (1966) 
L Boyle concludes that equalisation between individual ratepayers 
(rather than between individual authorities) cannot be achieved based 
on the rating system. This arises because there is no direct 
functional relationship between the tax and the incomes of those 
subject to it. Rather, the tax is a function of the rateable value of 
the property occupied by the local taxpayer and there is no direct 
relationship between rateable values and income. The ultimate benefi-
ciaries are owners of capital and land, grant being capitalised into 
their market values. See R Barnett and N Tophan "A Critique of 
Equalising Grants to Local Governments" Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol 27 No 3, November 1980. 
Finance for capital expenditure here refers to revenue contributions to 
capital outlay and debt charges accruing from borrowing. 
The Needs Element for 1982-83 accounts for some 87? of total RSG, with 
the Resources Element some 12% and the Domestic Element less than 1%. 
RSG itself accounts for over 90? of Scottish Exchequer Grants. Data 
for 1981-82 is in Table 6. 
There has, however, been a considerable amount of ongoing controversy 
about the assessment of the need to spend per head of population. 
Privatisation measures are summarised in the Treasury's Economic 
Progress Report, No 145, May 1982. The philosophical arguments 
antipathetic towards the public sector are provided by F A Hayek in his 
book "The Road to Serfdom" (1976). 
64 
